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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
ORVILLE RALPH COATES and 
DONNA COATES, his wife, 
) 
} 
) 
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) 
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) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
-vs-
AMERICAN ECONOMY INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
* * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* * * * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 17026 
This is an action wherein plaintiffs seek survivor 
benefits, funeral expenses and medical expenses under the 
Personal Injury Protection Endorsement provided in an auto-
mobile insurance contract between the plaintiffs and the 
'; .. • # .. ~ 
defendant. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOW.ER COURT 
The trial ~ourt in the First District Court of Box 
Elder County granted the plaintiffs' Motion for Sununary 
Judgment against the defendant for survivor benefits, fun-
eral expenses and medical costs. The trial court held that 
under the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act it is not 
necessary that the injured person occupy. a motor vehicle as 
defined in the No-Fault Act, but that where at least one of 
the vehicles involved in an accident is a motor vehicle as 
defined in the Act, the injuries are covered by the insur-
ance required under the No-Fault Act. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks a reversal of the trial 
court's ruling and a determination that the Utah Automobile 
No-Fault Insurance Act, § 31-41-1 et seq., o.c.A. (1953 as 
amended), specifically excludes persons riding motorcycles 
from its coverage. 
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STATEMENT OF PACTS 
The facts necessary for a determination of this 
appeal are contained in a Stipulated Facts for Purposes of 
Summary Judgment Only, said Stipulation having been entered 
into by counsel of record for the parties herein. (R. 36 -
50) Briefly, those stipulated facts are as follows: 
On the 8th day of July, 1978, Orville 
Ralph Coates and Donna Coates, his wife, were 
covered by an automobile insurance policy is-
sued by American Economy Insurance Company. 
Their son, Brent Ralph Coates, was an "insured 
person" under his parents' policy. On or about 
July 8, 1978, while said policy of insurance be-
tween plaintiffs and the defendant was in full 
force and effect, the plaintiffs' son, Brent 
Ralph Coates, was operating a motorcycle con-
signed to Vesco's Sports Center and while prop-
erly operating said motorcycle, was struck by 
a motor vehicle operated by Ferris Reeder at 
approximately 4th North and Main Street in Brig-
ham City, Utah. -Brent Ralph Coates died that 
same day as a result of injuries sustained in 
the collision. The plaintiffs, as parents of 
the deceased, have incurred and been required to 
pay certain expenses in connection with the in-
juries, death and-burial of the deceased and have 
suffered certain losses as the survivors of the 
deceased. The plaintiffs have paid all funeral 
expenses in connection with the burial of Brent 
Ralph Coates and have incurred medical expenses 
in the amount of $675.25. 
The parties also attached ~,COP¥ of .~he_automobile 
insurance policy to the Stipulated Facts. Both parties then 
moved the trial court for summary judgment and, following 
oral argument on their respective motions, the trial court 
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entered an Order granting plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH AUTOMOBILE NO-FAULT 
INSURANCE ACT, § 31-41-1 et seq., u.c.A. 
(1953, AS AMENDED). 
In 1973, the Utah State Legislature adopted the 
Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act to become effective 
January 1, 1974. The "No Fault Act" is codified at § 31-41-
1 through S 31-41-13. 4, Utah Code Annotated { 1953, as am-
ended). 
follows: 
The purpose of the Act is stated in § 31-41-2 as 
To require the payment of certain pres-
cribed benefits in respect to motor veh-
icle accidents through either insurance or 
other approved security but on the basis 
of no fault •• 
The Act provides that persons injured in motor vehicle 
accidents are entitled to certain minimum benefits from 
either their insurance policy or other s~curity. Section 
.... '! - . ' -·-
31-41-7 sets forth the applicability of the requfred insur-
ance coverage. The pertinent provisions pf that section 
are: 
-4-
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(1) The coverages described in Section 
31-41-6 shall be applicable to: 
(a) Personal injuries sustained by the 
insured w~en injured in an accident in 
this state involving any motor vehicle. 
. . . 
Section 31-41-3 sets forth the definition of the terms used 
in the Act. In pertinent part, the section provides: 
(1) "Motor Vehicle" means any vehicle 
of a kind required to be registered under 
Title 41, but excluding, however motor-
cycles. (emphasis added) 
These provisions of the No-Fault Act indicate a 
specific legislative intent to exclude motorcycles from the 
coverage of the Act. It is clear from the language of the 
Act that the legislature intended that Personal Injury 
Protection benefits normally available to motor vehicle 
operators would not be available to persons injured while 
operating a motorcycle. . However, any ambiguity in the 
language of the statute is dissolved and the legislative 
intent made crystal clear by the debate surrounding an 
Amendment of the Act which occurred in 1975. 
- ., 
In 197 5, Senate Bill -No. 45 prc;>poqed .. a~ amendment 
to the statutory language of the No-Fault Act. The amend-
ment was proposed in an attempt to correct a problem which 
had arisen concerning benefits claimed by persons injured 
while riding motorcycles. Although the No-Fault Act as 
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originally enacted had excluded motorcycles from the defini-
tion of mote( vehicle, and therefore, presumably from cover-
age under the Act, these persons were claiming benefits as 
pedestrians. The original definition of pedestrian in the 
No-Fault Act, § 31-41-3(6), was as follows: "'Pedestrian' 
means any natural person not occupying or riding upon a 
motor vehicle. 18 
Since by definition a motorcycle was not a motor 
vehicle, persons injured while riding motorcycles claimed 
that they were ent.i tled to benefits as pedestrians and the 
legislative debate reveals that several of these claims had 
been paid by insurance companies. The amendment proposed to 
change the definition of pedestrian to read: •'Pedestrian' 
means any natural person not occupying or riding upon a 
motor vehicle, ex cl ud ing, however, any natural person oc-
cupying or riding upon a motorcycle." The legislative 
debate surrounding this proposed a:nend.11ent makes the intent 
of the legislature, both as to the original passage of the 
No-Fault Act, and as to the amendment, absolutely unambig-
uous. 
Senator Wilford R. Black, [DJ Salt Lake County, 
sponsored the amendment and stated _that :_the~ reas~n for the 
proposed amendment was to prevent the driver of a motorcycle 
from having a "free ride" on the insurance of an automobile 
driver who had no-fault insurance. On February 4, 1975 , the 
senate became a committee of the whole to hear evidence 
-6-
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concerning the proposed amendment. Mr. Melvin Summerhays 
appeared from the Utah State Insurance Commissioner's Office 
and testified, in substance, that motorcycles were excluded 
in most States from No-Fault Acts because the inherent risks 
associated with motorcycles were too high for any reasonable 
premiwn and insurance companies did not wish to combine the 
risks of motorcycles together with the risks of the general 
motoring public. He stated that the Insurance Commissioner 
had not anticipated that motorcyclists would be able to 
claim benefits as pedestrians under the original No-Fault 
Act and that, in effect, the motorcyclist was receiving 
something for nothing. Mr. Summerhays testified: 
In other words, if he has an accident with 
your vehicle now, if he is at fault or other-
wise, he can run into your car if you are 
sitting still and he has benefits of your 
no-fault policy as a pedestrian. Now the 
reason this isn't fair is because you and I 
will have to pay his premiums. We will have 
to have our rates raised eventually. It will 
cost you and I and the citizens additional pre-
miums to take care of motorcyclists under the 
Act if he is left a pedestrian. So the real 
intent of the amendment is to take the motor-
cyclist out of the pedestrian classification 
and leave him recourse to tort liability and 
the Financial Responsibility Law where he be-
longs at a rate he can afford to pay. 
. , 
1 • ·.. . 
Mr. Carl Halbert, an insurance representative, 
also testified and supported the statements of Mr. Summer-
hays. Be reiterated that in an accident between a motor 
vehicle and a motorcycle, it is generally the driver and/or 
passenger of the motorcycle that are injured and they are 
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receiving benefits which were not intended to be paid by the 
No-Fault Insurance policies carried by automobile drivers, 
Mr. Keith McCune of State Farm Insurance company testified 
concerning a case wherein State· Farm had paid more than 
$22,000.00 to a motorcyclist and his children who were 
injured in an accident wherein the motorcyclist was at 
fault, but was colle·cting from the Personal Injury Protec-
tion Benefits of the automobile driver's policy as a pedest-
rian. 
In concluding the debate, Senator Black reiterated 
the reasons for his sponsorship of the Amendment and claimed 
that the present situation allowing motorcyclists to claim 
benefits as pedestrians was highly unfair and that the 
Amendment should be adopted. The Senate subsequently adop-
ted the proposed Amendment. 
The proposed &-rnendment was then considered by the 
Utah House of Representatives wherein it was debated on 
February 12, 1975. Representative James Hansen, [R] Davis 
County, argued that the general motoring public was picking 
up the bill for motorcyclists and this was not intended when 
the No-Fault Act was originally adopted. He stated: 
"All this is trying to do when s~nator ~lack 
introduced this AmenCL-rnent.· is to take the 
motorcyclist out of the definition of a 
pedestrian. A motorcyclist should not be 
a pedestrian, and I think they overlooked 
that." 
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Representative T. Quentin Cannon [R] Salt Lak·-! 
County, stated: 
0 We are saying they are no longer a pedes-
trian, nor are they covered by the No-Fault 
Act. If the motorcyclist strikes me, or I 
strike him, regardless of fault, they are 
under the old system of tort liability •••• 
The motorcyclists don't want to be within 
the No-Fault Act, because the premiums are 
so high. It will not shift liability. The 
motorcyclist is under the old system of 
tort reparations. This Amendment is mak-
ing the motorcyclist carry the burden him-
self .. " 
The Amendment then was passed by the House and 
became effective on May 13, 1975. 
Appellant believes the above-cited history of the 
legislative debate surrounding the Utah No-Fault Act makes 
it abundantly clear that the intent of the Utah Legislature, 
both in enacting the original No-Fault Act, and in enacting 
subsequent amendments, was to exclude motorcyclists from the 
benefits of the coverages required under the Act. Indeed, 
when the legislature was made aware that motorcyclists were 
receiving benefits pursuant to the Act as originally enact-
ed, they quickly moved to amend that "loophole" to eliminate 
any possibility that motorcyclists would be entitled to such 
benef.i ts. Al though the appellant. raisea .the <Lssue of the 
clear legislative intent behind the No-Fault Act in its 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the trial court made 
no finding concerning this issue and erred in failing to 
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consider the legislative intent in interpreting the provis-
ions of the No-Fault Act. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that 
in interpreting statutory language, the legislative intent 
is crucial to the determination of the meaning of the part-
icular statute. The Utah Supreme Court most recently dealt 
with this principle in the case of Osuala v. Aetna Life a~ 
.. 
Casualty, 608 P.2d 242 (Utah 1980). In that case, the 
plaintiff .... was injured when the automobile he was driving 
collided with a truck own-ed by a construction companyc The 
plaintiff brought an action· against the construction comp-
any' s insurer to obtain Personal Injury Protection Benefits 
under the No-Fault Act. The trial court held that the 
plaintiff was neither an insured nor a person entitled to 
protection under the insurance policy the defendant had 
issued to the construction company. On appeal, this court 
affirmed. In ruling on the plaintiff's claims pursuant ~ 
certain provisions of the No-Fault Act, this Court stated: 
There are some cardinal rules of statutory 
construction to be considered in relation · 
to this controversy. If there is doubt or 
uncertainty as to the meaning or aoplica-
tion of the provisions_of an act, 1t is 
appropriate to analyze the act in its en-
tirety, in the light of its· objective .. and 
. . . . , 
to harmonize its provisions in accordance 
with the legislative intent and purpose •• 
In the instant case, the Utah No-Fault ~ct in iU 
entirety and in its objective is clearly to reduce the cost 
-10-
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of automobile insurance to the motoring public. This ob-
jective and the purpose underlying the entice Act would be 
subverted by allowing motorcyclists to obtain benefits under 
the Act for which they have not paid and the cost of which 
must be borne by the general motoring public. The legisla-
tive debate makes clear the legislative intent behind the 
Act and appellant contends that the trial court erred in 
failing to analyze the Act consistent with the principles 
enunciated above. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE 
RATIONALE OF CASE LAW FROM OUTSIDE THE 
JURISDICTION AND ERRED IN ITS INTERPRE-
TATION OF SAID CASE LAW. 
The trial court's Order granting plaintiff's 
Summary Judgment is based upon the trial court's own Memor-
andum Decision dated March 24, 1980 (R. 56 - 58) In the 
court's Memorandum Decision, the Court discusses cases 
concerning the issue raised in the instant case and con-
eludes that certain of these cases are the better reasoned 
view and subsequently holds for the plaintiffs and respond-
ents. However, defendant and appellant believes' that most, 
if not all, of these cases are inapplicable to the instant 
case for the simple reason that no other state's No-Fault 
statute is identical to that of the State of Utah, nor are 
they even substantially similar. Further, defendant and 
-11-
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appellant contends that the trial court erred in its inter-
pretation of certain of these cases. 
Appellant believes that the better reasoned view 
is represented by the case of Speakman v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company, 402 Ao2d 123 (Md. App. 1979). 
In that case, the plaintiff was the named insured in an 
automobile insurance policy issued by defendant, which 
policy provided 
coverage. The 
$10, 000 .. 00 in personal injury protection 
plaintiff brought an action against the · 
defendant for hospital and medical bills and loss of income 
suffered as a result of an accident wherein the plaintiff, 
while operating his motorcycle, was struck by an automo-
bile. The Maryland No-Fault Act did not expressly exclude 
motorcycles from its prov is ions, as the Utah No-Fault Act 
expressly provides. However, the Maryland No-Fault Act did 
provide that insurance companies could exclude benefits for 
persons injured while operating motorcycles. The defendant 
insurance company chose to ·specifically exclude benefits for 
persons injured while riding motorcycles and the plaintiff 
conceded the legitimacy of the exclusion contained in the 
policy. However, the plaintiff argued that since the ace~ 
dent in which he was injured involv~d ano~h~r ~otor vehicle, 
i.e. the automobile with which he collided, he was still 
entitled to benefits. The Court of Special Appeals of 
-12-
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Maryland affirmed the trial court's holding that the plain-
tiff was not entitled to benefits under the plain and unam-
biguous language of the insurance policy. 
Appellant believes that the Speaki~an case is 
correct in its interpretation of the phrase upon which the 
plaintiffs and respondents rely in the instant case, i.e. 
that plaintiff's decedent was killed in an accident "involv-
ing any motor vehicle." Indeed, the Maryland case revolved 
around the chosen language in the insurance policy, whereas 
the instant case revolves around statutory language intended 
by the Utah Legislature to exclude motorcyclists from bene-
fits under the Act. 
The trial court was pursuaded by cases other than 
the Maryland case cited above. The trial court cited the 
New Jersey cases of Hoglin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
c 
Company, 366 A.2d 345 (N.J. App. 1976) and Harlan v. Fidel-
it:( & Casuali;.Y Company, 353 A.2d 151 (N.J. App. 1976) in 
support of its ultimate decision. However, the Heglin case 
revolved around an obvious conflict between the terms of the 
ins_urance policy between plaintiff and defendant and the 
statutory language of the New Jersey No-Fault Law. The 
insurance company attempt to limit coverage was found to 
conflict with the statute and the Superior Court of New 
Jersey, Appellate Division, held that the plaintiff was 
entitled to benefits, although he was occupying a motorcycle 
at the time of the accident. Moreover, the New Jersey Court 
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relied upon a treatise prepared by the former counsel to the 
New Jersey Automobile Insurance Study Commission which 
concluded that the intent of the Act was to provide coverage 
in the type of situation before the court. The Harlan case 
is yet another example of a conflict between the provisions 
of the insurance policy and the provisions of the No-Fault 
Law, where the court held that the statute prevails. This 
is not the issue before the court in the instant case, 
Indeed, the defendant and appellant in the. instant case 
modeled its language in the insurance policy precisely after 
the statutory language contained in the Utah No-Fault Act, 
relying on the clear meaning and legislative intent behind 
the Act that motorcyclists would be excluded from coverage. 
The trial court proceeded in its Memorandum Decis-
ion to cite the case of Sh.oemaker v ~ Na tion~l Ben Franklin 
of Michigan, 259 N. W. 2d 414 (Mich. App. 1977), as supportive 
of the trial court's holding. However, appellant believes 
that the trial court clearly erred in relying upon this 
case. In the Michigan case, the plaintiff was injured while 
riding a motorcycle which collided with a farm tractor. The 
plaintiff brought suit to recover No-Fault Benefits from his 
automobile insurance company.· The t~ial court granted 
•! .. •a'°' : 
Summary Judgment to the insurer and, on appeal, the court of 
Appeals of Michigan affirmed, al though remanding on other 
grounds. The court stated in part: 
-14-
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••• It is this court's duty to determine 
the legislative intent, looking at t~~ lang-
uage used in the set statute, its su~ject mat-
ter, scope and purpose, and the act s~~~ld be 
construed to render it internally consistent 
and to avoid absurd results. • • • It is our 
belief that it would work an absurdity to hold 
that plaintiffs can recover for injuries from 
a motorcycle accident, because of the fortui-
tous purchase of an automobile No-Fault policy, 
after the legislature went to great lengths to 
exclude tractors and motorcycles from coverage 
under the Act. Having limited an insurer's risk 
to not include motorcycles, we find no legis-
lative intent nor judicial prerogative to im-
pose an even greater risk by imposin3 liability 
on an insurer that has issued a policy on an 
automobile and has issued no policy on a motor-
cycle. 
How the Shoemaker case can be said to support the 
trial court's ruling is beyond the capacity of the appellant 
to understand or explain. However, appellant wishes to 
point out to this Court that in a later Michigan case, Pier-
sante v. American Fidelity Fire Insurance Company, 278 
N.W.2d 691 (Mich. App. 1979), the Michigan Court rendered a 
decision substantially supporting the trial court's decision 
in the instant case. It should be also noted, however, that 
the Michigan No-Fault Act appears substantially different 
from that of Utah and that the. Michigan Court in Piersante 
relied heavily upon certain priority provisions of the Act 
in reaching its result. 
Finally, the trial court relied upon dicta from a 
Florida case, Negron v. The Travelers Insurance Company, 282 
S. 2d 28 (Fla. App. 1 973) • The facts of that case are not 
similar or relevant to the instant case and appellant is 
-15-
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unable to explain how the dicta in Negron is applicable 
here. In any event, the Florida Court was later presented 
with the precise issue now before this court in Long Island 
Insurance Company v.· Frank, 328 S.2d 542 (Fla. App. 1976). 
In that case, the plaintiff in the trial court, Mr. Frank, 
brought suit to recover No-Fault Benefits on behalf of his 
minor son, a member of plaintiff's household, for injuri~ 
sustained while the minor son was operating a motorcycle 
which collided with another motor vehicle. Plaintiff urg~ 
the same argument on the Florida Court that plaintiffs and 
respondents urge in the instant case, that because the 
accident involved a motor vehicle, the plaintiff is entitl~ 
to recover benefits. However, the Florida Court disagreed 
and held in favor of the insurance company, thus clearly 
indicating that the dicta from Negron does not support the 
trial court's decision nor the position of the plaintiffs 
and respondents. 
Defendant and appellate does not believe that aey 
case from a jurisdiction outside the State of Utah is part-
icularly applicable, much less disposi tive, of the issue 
before this Court. The language of the Utah No-Fault Act 
appears to be unique in comparison witt\. the language con-
~ .. .... .. . 
tained in the No-Fault Acts construed in the cases cited 
abov·e and, therefore, ·those cases cannot determine the 
interpretation of different language in the Utah statute. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant and appellant urges this Court to apply 
the excellent criteria contained in the Osuala case concern-
ing the issue of statutory construction. Appellant believes 
that the Utah No-Fault Act in its entirety, its clearly 
stated objective, its legislative intent and purpose, all 
combine to make clear the meaning of the statutory provision 
at issue. The Utah Legislature clearly intended to exclude 
motorcyclists from the benefits of the Act and the statutory 
language reflects that intent. While at least one court 
outside the State of Utah has ruled on this issue consis-
tently with appellant's position, appellant does not believe 
that case law from outside the State is readily applicable 
to a determination of the meaning of a Utah Statute, pecu-
1 iar to Utah. Appellant urges this Court to reverse the 
decision of the trial court and to remand the case for 
further proceedings consistent with that opinion. 
1980. 
Respectfully submitted this IC+-11-..,... day of July, 
KIPP &.~D CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
_-i~b~ L0{Ljr\ 
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